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In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied,
embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of
cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism,
the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives
toward building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not
only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups, cognitive
artifacts, and their environment. Wide perspectives are essentially research heuristics
for building mechanistic explanations. The claim is substantiated with reference to
recent developments in the study of “mindreading” and debates on emotions. We
argue that the current practice in cognitive (neuro)science has undergone, in effect, a
silent mechanistic revolution, and has turned from initial binary oppositions and abstract
proposals toward the integration of wide perspectives with the rest of the cognitive
(neuro)sciences.
Keywords: embodied cognition, grounded cognition, extended mind, scaffolded mind, enactivism, distributed
cognition, mechanistic explanation, wide mechanism
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, cognitive science has been methodologically individualist and has treated cognition
as the capacity of individuals. Usually, it has framed intelligent behavior in terms of the processing
of internal representations of individual minds and explained it in terms of functional analyses of
mental capacities. The epitome of such methodology can be found in the important milestone both
for cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience, David Marr’s Vision (Marr, 1982).
Recently, embodied cognition, embedded cognition, the extended mind, enactivism, as well as
distributed cognition, have offered challenges to the traditional approach in different ways. Broadly
speaking, what connects these positions is that they account for cognition in terms of embodied
interactions supported and extended by actively built cognitive niches. This variety of approaches,
which we dub “wide cognition,” offer a new picture of cognition. Cognition is no longer understood
in an extremely modular fashion, for example as opposed to perception, action, or emotion, and is
situated in social and cultural contexts.
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Yet by the same token, the controversies over these wide
perspectives have become outdated. Distributed cognitive
processing is no longer usefully understood in terms of
embodied cognition, extended cognition, enactivism, or
distributed cognition alone, and our claim is that these views,
in essence, offer mainly abstract heuristics that cannot do much
explanatory work in isolation. In this paper, we propose that they
are more useful in offering guidance for building multifaceted
models of causal mechanisms responsible for cognition. Indeed,
by going mechanistic, wide approaches can become non-trivial
and integrated explanatory proposals, and we believe that this is
what is happening right now.
In this paper, we first concisely characterize the contribution
of several of the wide perspectives that were essential to the
mechanistic turn in the study of cognition, which we shortly
summarize. Next, by relying on case studies, we show that none of
these perspectives alone offers the whole explanatory framework
for cognition. Instead, they offer heuristic guidance for the study
of mechanisms involved.
WIDE ACCOUNTS OF COGNITION
By wide cognition we mean an approach to cognition that
cites wide factors, i.e., factors that go beyond intracranial
processes. These include embodied, embedded, extended,
enacted, and distributed cognition, which are related but distinct
concepts. These research approaches are also inspired by earlier
wide accounts of cognitive processes that include ecological
psychology (Gibson, 1986), biosemiotics (Favareau, 2010), and
sociocultural psychology (Leont’ev, 1974; Vygotsky, 1986).
In contradistinction to traditional frameworks of cognitive
science, these approaches do not explain cognitive phenomena
solely (or at all) in terms of the intra-neural manipulation of
(language-like) internal representations but stress the fact that
(a) minds can extend into or rely heavily on the environment;
(b) embodiment is essential to cognition; (c) cognition is
enacted, or constructed, in an active fashion; (d) cognitive
phenomena are always constituted by interactions with the
environment; (e) and cognitive acts are not always but sometimes
paradigmatically distributed among multiple agents. However,
theoretical presentations of these approaches remain fairly
abstract and focused on deciding yes–no questions rather than
building unified models of cognitive phenomena.
In other words, the accounts of wide approaches follow the
steps of “trying to play 20 questions with nature and win,”
as Newell (1973) has put it. Newell observed that cognitive
psychologists had their tasks of choice that they treated as
indicative of grand issues in psychology, but their theorizing
remained bizarrely tied both to details of single tasks and to
grand issues at the same time, without painting any broader
picture of cognition. These grand issues were stated in an
extremely abstract fashion: nature vs. nurture, continuous vs.
all-or-none learning, serial vs. parallel processing, analog vs.
digital, conscious vs. unconscious, grammars vs. associations
for language, etc. Similarly, in the debates over wide cognitive
approaches, instead of explaining how cognition works by
describing underlying and interacting mechanisms, at least some
researchers attempt to win the debate by showing that the bodily,
the environmental, or the interactive aspect is most essential in
cognitive functioning. This did not work in the 1970s (as Newell
rightly noted) and remains unproductive today. Grand issues in
the study of cognition cannot be fruitfully understood in terms of
a series of simple dichotomies.
However, wide approaches also inspired researchers to search
for more integrated explanations, just like abstract questions
paired with cherry-picked experimental phenomena that earlier
(negatively) inspired Newell to propose the study of unified
architectures of cognition. Simply, Newell thought that an
integrative theory was lacking in cognitive psychology (Newell,
1973, 1990). As we argue, mechanistic explanations are used to
the same effect today: to offer an integrated view on cognition,
but in a piecemeal fashion, unlike Newell who promoted the idea
of sketching a general blueprint for all cognitive systems.
Embodied and Grounded Cognition
The claim of embodied cognition (EC) is that the physical body
of an agent is relevant to cognition; in other words, cognitive
processing includes, in a non-trivial fashion, not only processes
that occur in the brain but also processes that occur outside the
brain, in the body of the agent.1 Cognition thus depends deeply
on the features of the physical body (Varela et al., 1991; Clark,
1997; Damasio, 2000; Gallagher, 2005; Byrge et al., 2014; Shapiro,
2018).
EC has become increasingly widespread in all areas of
cognitive science—from neuroscience and cognitive psychology
to cognitive linguistics, philosophy, computer science, and
robotics. Over the past decades, this has led to an impressive burst
of experimental evidence for the role of the body in cognition,
in particular within psychology and neuroscience (Willems and
Hagoort, 2007; Barsalou, 2008; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Toni
et al., 2008; Jirak et al., 2010; Pulvermüller, 2013; Costello and
Bloesch, 2017; Varga and Heck, 2017). The shared aspect of
EC theories is their opposition to classical, propositional views,
which hold that cognition boils down to the manipulation of
amodal, abstract, and arbitrary codes (cf. Shapiro, 2014). In
contrast, according to EC theorists, cognition is constrained and
enabled by the specific characteristics of our own brain-body
system.
Embedded and Situated Cognition
The embedded and situated approach to cognition holds
that cognition should be framed in terms of the (usually
time-pressured) interaction of the agent and its immediate
surroundings. The extra-bodily context constrains and enables
cognition (Agre and Chapman, 1987; Suchman, 1987; Norman,
1993).
Many lines of inquiry offer support to the embedded
mind (and by extension, situated cognition). For example,
1Some authors (Barsalou, 2008, 2016; Pezzulo et al., 2011) reduce the stress put on
the role of the body, and prefer to use the more general term “grounded cognition”
in order to emphasize the fact that cognition is grounded, not only in bodily states,
but also in situations, situated simulations, and so forth.
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behavior-based robotics, as pioneered by Brooks (1991), arguably
supports the claims made by embedded cognition and situated
cognition. Brooks demonstrated that it was possible to build
robots capable of performing simple tasks despite those robots
having no detailed, internal knowledge of the environments in
which they were operating. Such robots were designed to be “set
up to be set off” by certain features of their local surroundings,
bypassing the need for complex, internal cognitive machinery.
The work of Brooks, and many others, has shown that basic
cognitive functions could be causally dependent on movement
and structures in the local environment (Steels and Brooks, 1995).
Extended Mind
The extended mind is the idea that an agent’s mind is not
necessarily brain-bound and can incorporate external resources
such as tools, language, and external systems to enhance or
augment cognitive processes (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). This
idea may be understood narrowly to mean that that some
elements of the agent’s surrounding are its proper cognitive
parts, while according to a broader account, a hybrid system is
constituted by coupling the agent’s cognitive processing with its
environment (Clark, 2008b; see also Hutchins, 2014).
The difference between this approach and embedded
cognition lies in the claim, endorsed by the extended mind
theorists but rejected by embedded cognition theorists, that at
least some parts of what was traditionally considered as ‘the
environment’ may be properly understood as literal parts of the
agent’s mind.
The practical implications of the extended mind turn on
exactly how and under what circumstances external resources
might integrate with internal or biological ones. What properties
of cognitive artifacts might make them prone to integration?
Theorists differ in how they answer this question (Sterelny,
2010). Some have endorsed an extended functionalist approach
(Clark, 2008b; Sprevak, 2009; Wheeler, 2017), whereby it
is the functional (i.e., causal) role of the technology that
makes it part of someone’s mind. Others insist that it is
the bodily manipulation of such technologies that integrates
them into a cognitive routine (Menary, 2010b). A related
but importantly distinct approach is the complementarity
framework (Sutton, 2006; Menary, 2010a), which proposes that
we tend to integrate tools and artifacts into our cognitive
processes when they provide resources which complement
our existing biological systems. Menary’s idea of cognitive
integration comes, in fact, very close to the idea of multiscale
and multilevel causal explanations as required by mechanistic
explanation.
Enactive Cognition
The enactive approach to cognition recognizes a crucial
inter-dependency between an autonomous agent and the world
it inhabits. Cognitive activity is wholly determined neither by the
agents nor by their environment, but rather it emerges from the
inter-dependency between the two.
This observation lies at the heart of the enactive
approach. It forms the basis for the mode of analysis and
understanding central to enactive thinking (Thompson, 2007;
McGann et al., 2013). However, one can distinguish at least
four quite distinct flavors of the enactivist framework:
sensorimotor enactivism, which deems action as essential
to perception and cognition (O’Regan and Noë, 2001);
autopoietic (or classical) enactivism, which grounds cognition
in autonomous organization of biological entities (Varela,
1979, 1997; Weber and Varela, 2002); participatory sense-
making enactivism, which understands cognition as relying
on interactions between autonomous agents (De Jaegher and
Di Paolo, 2007; Thompson and Stapleton, 2009; Di Paolo and
De Jaegher, 2012); and radical enactivism, which denies the
role of mental representation in explanations of cognition
(Hutto and Myin, 2013). Just because the sensorimotor
flavor is conceptually close to embodied cognition, it may
be considered as an action-oriented version of embodied
cognition. The empirical consequences of radical enactivism
are still a matter of some dispute. Thus, for the sake of
simplicity, below, we focus on the classical autopoietic version
of enactivism and its later extension, participatory sense-making
enactivism.
For enactivists who build on the work of Varela et al. (1991),
cognition is a process of sense-making, a continuous process
of adaptive coping by an agent to the vagaries of being a
living being embedded in a complex world (Thompson and
Stapleton, 2009). In this sense, cognition is directly continuous
with the biological processes of staying alive in what is sometimes
called a “life-mind continuity” (Thompson, 2007). An organism
makes sense of its world through the process of integrating the
environment effectively into its own processes of self-production.
In the domain of chemistry and biological cells, this process
of self-production is called “autopoiesis” (Maturana and Varela,
1980; Weber and Varela, 2002; Froese and Stewart, 2010), and this
capacity for continued self-production provides a ground-level
value to the activity of the system. But the same dynamics, if
different processes, apply at other levels of analysis, such as the
production of identities within social groups. These different
levels of description are never wholly independent of one another,
because all cognitive activity is bodily, and so values that arise
within the social domain are always contextualized and coupled
(even if loosely) to values within the biological (Di Paolo et al.,
2017).
Social interaction is a special case of such engagement with
the environment, in which the agent’s activity is not simply
coordinated with a physical world but with another agent.
Sense-making in such situations is not simply coordinated
but negotiated, a process termed participatory sense-making
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). Where effective social
coordination is achieved, participatory sense-making produces
meaning and cognitive activity that is shared across the
participants. This sense-making must be understood as
much in terms of the conversation or interaction as a
whole as through the combined activities of the individuals
involved.
Distributed Cognition
The distributed cognition (DC) approach expands the classical
focus on cognition as a property of an individual organism/agent
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 December 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2393
fpsyg-09-02393 December 5, 2018 Time: 10:15 # 4
Miłkowski et al. From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms
toward the components and operations of larger cognitive
systems, which may encompass multiple individual agents and
artifacts.
This distinguishes DC from other approaches labeled here
as ‘wide cognition,’ which usually treat an individual organism
as the main unit of analysis, describing, for example, the way
an individual is embedded, connected to his/her environment
or how his/her body matters from the perspective of cognitive
processes. In the case of DC, the focus is on heterogeneous
elements (e.g., biological, material, discursive), which take part in
sequential or simultaneous processes of generation, transmission
and transformation of representational states. DC identifies
such processes with cognition (Hutchins, 1995a). Moreover,
in DC, representational states are not understood as mental
states or other inner states of any individual agent. Examples of
representational states can instead include meaningful gestures
or poses of agents, written or spoken information, visualizations
displayed on screens, lines drawn on a navigational chart and
the chart itself, but also non-symbolic cues which modify the
behavior of agents (Zhang and Norman, 1994). Representatives
of DC stress that a larger cognitive system works in a different
manner and has different properties than individual agents who
may be part of the system. Unlike the extended mind approach,
the agent’s mind need not be the center of such a cognitive
system: “some systems have a clear center while other systems
have multiple centers or no center at all” (Hutchins, 2014, p. 37).
However, according to the pioneer and leading theoretician of
the approach, Edwin Hutchins, DC is not a kind or a special case
of cognition, but a perspective on all of cognition; therefore, “all
instances of cognition can be seen as emerging from distributed
processes” (Hutchins, 2014, p. 36), which is especially useful in
studying a particular type of systems mentioned above. Thus,
the difference between the extended mind approach and DC
is not a difference of type, but a difference of the level of the
analysis.
FROM WIDE PERSPECTIVES TO
MECHANISMS
Even if one can analytically distinguish embodied, embedded,
extended, enacted, and distributed views, they are not always
mutually exclusive,2 and a large body of research exhibits
properties specific to many of the above approaches. This
is not a coincidence. They are not poised to be complete
and exclusive accounts of cognition. They are not theories in
the sense of providing complete predictions or explanations
of phenomena in question. For this, they are too abstract.
There is no particular novel prediction that the embodied
perspective may offer when applied, for example, to group
decision making in a faculty meeting. In this, these perspectives
2The embedded view may be considered inconsistent with the extended mind as far
as these views do not agree what is the part of a cognitive system and what is not;
a smartphone is not part of a cognitive system for a theorist of situated cognition,
while it is literally part of one’s mind according to the extended mind thesis. But
these frameworks are explanatorily equivalent from the mechanistic point of view,
as we argue below. Here, we focus on their explanatory virtues.
are not different from grand research traditions of cognitive
science.
Providing Guiding Heuristics
Wide approaches are research traditions, and research traditions
are not to be conflated with complete theories. To illustrate this,
take computationalism, which is another grand research tradition
in cognitive science (Miłkowski, 2018). As such, however,
computationalism does not offer any predictions for group
decision making either. What they do instead is provide certain
guiding heuristics. A proponent of traditional computational
modeling would ask what the overall task is and why solving it
is appropriate; what the algorithms and representations involved
are; and how they are physically implemented. The embodied
cognition paradigm asks how this task is related to bodily, in
particular to sensorimotor, features of decision makers. The
embedded approach points out that there may be important
environmental factors, and the extended mind may alert us to the
fact that there might be important cognitive artifacts in operation.
Finally, the enactive perspective (at least in its non-classical
version) points to participatory negotiation of how the activity
is perceived by various agents involved, and the distributed
perspective hints that the phenomenon may involve not only
human agents but also external representations and instruments.
Note that even if the phenomenon is only slightly influenced by
bodily features, for example, it need not mean that embodied
cognition is thereby falsified. Heuristics are fallible, after all.
We claim that instead of asking yes/no questions to nature,
at least some researchers involved in the study of cognition
from wide perspectives are more and more interested in building
models of cognitive mechanisms. This kind of explanatory
practice goes beyond mere binary oppositions that state that
the role of the environment is crucial or not, or that the
environment has been appropriated by the cognitive system as its
proper part. Instead, these researchers treat—or at least should
treat—cognitive systems as organized spatiotemporal systems,
comprised of entities and activities that are jointly responsible
for their phenomena of interest, which is evidenced by attempts
to integrate, for example, embodied and extended approaches
(Clark, 2008b; Borghi and Cimatti, 2010; Borghi et al., 2013;
Walter, 2014). Differences between approaches matter only for
expository purposes but not really for their practice, which
involves mechanistic modeling of cognition.
Relying on Mechanisms
As proponents of so-called new mechanism stress, many fields
of science already appeal to mechanisms to explain their
phenomena of interest (Machamer et al., 2000; Glennan, 2017).
This is true of life sciences but also cognitive (neuro)science
(Thagard and Kroon, 2006; Waskan, 2006; Bechtel, 2008;
Miłkowski, 2013; Piccinini, 2015) and social sciences (Hedström
and Ylikoski, 2010). While the philosophical analyses of the
notion of mechanism differ (Glennan and Illari, 2017; for
a review, see Illari and Williamson, 2011), in a nutshell,
the idea is the following: A mechanism is an organized
spatiotemporal structure responsible for the occurrence of at
least one phenomenon to be explained. The orchestrated causal
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interaction of the mechanism’s component parts and operations
explains the phenomenon at hand. In a certain sense, the new
mechanistic account is extremely lean, leaving out practically all
physical details of what mechanisms as such might be. They are
only causally organized spatiotemporal structures.
According to the mechanistic account of explanation,
there are no mechanisms per se, only mechanisms of some
phenomena; mechanisms should not be confused with organized
spatiotemporal systems, processes or structures. Mechanisms are
wholes comprised of component parts and operations but they
are delineated by the phenomena they are responsible for, and
phenomena are not to be conflated with observable features
of a given spatiotemporal system; to understand the nature
of a phenomenon, extensive theoretical considerations may be
required (Bogen and Woodward, 1988).3 For example, it is widely
agreed that human beings are capable of producing a potentially
unbounded number of linguistic utterances (Chomsky, 1959).
Obviously, it is physically impossible to observe anyone
producing literally an infinite series of utterances because people
are mortal. But there are theoretical reasons to specify the
phenomenon of linguistic productivity in such an idealizing
fashion.
Constitutive Explanations
Mechanistic explanations that elucidate how a given
phenomenon occurs by referring to component parts and
operations of a mechanism are called constitutive explanations.
Explanatory texts of this kind cite the internal causal and
part-whole organization of the mechanism as responsible for the
phenomenon at hand. For example, to explain the phenomenon
of how one cuts a piece of rope with scissors, we can describe the
scissors as composed of two metal blades with handles connected
so that the sharpened edges slide against each other when handles
are closed. In other words, there are components (blades with
handles, a screw that joints the blades) and operations (bringing
together the blades) organized in such a way that cutting occurs.
Given the importance of the study of components and
operations, it is not surprising that mechanistic explanations
are guided by two important heuristics: localization and
decomposition (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010). By localizing
where operations happen and breaking down the whole system
into its component parts, researchers discover the internal
structure of the mechanism. Importantly, a larger mechanism
may comprise a number of individual mechanisms organized
together; while the circulatory system is a mechanism responsible
for blood circulation, its component mechanism, the heart, is
also a mechanism, which is a proper part of the circulatory
system. The goal of mechanistic modeling is to be able to
conceptually recompose the mechanism from its component
parts and operations. Recomposing is only possible when the
3Note that while theorists are free to specify phenomena according to their
interest, they may also be wrong (Craver, 2009). For example, in the 19th century,
American psychiatrists would diagnose “drapetomania,” or the desire to break free,
as a psychiatric condition in slaves, while this phenomenon is not a psychiatric
condition at all. It was simply a racist construct and causal models of drapetomania
would fail to distinguish the purportedly pathological behavior from rational action
because fleeing is rational for anyone kept in slavery (Pöyhönen, 2013).
explanatory text is complete, that is, when it satisfies the
completeness norm. This norm requires that the explanatory
text represent “all and only the relevant portions of the causal
structure of the world” (Craver, 2007b, p. 27). This is not to say
that mechanistic explanations are supposed to give every possible
detail about the mechanism; no, only explanatorily relevant detail
counts (Baetu, 2015; Craver and Kaplan, 2018).
Localization and decomposition are merely heuristics; they
may fail without making mechanistic explanation impossible.
Bechtel and Richardson stress that while “decomposability may
be a natural and fruitful starting point, it may be no more than
that” (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010, p. 32). Fully decomposable
systems are an extreme case, in which the sum is nothing more
than its parts. As Bechtel and Richardson stress, it is much more
likely that biological systems are near decomposable (Bechtel and
Richardson, 2010, p. 26). The notion of near decomposability
was introduced by Herbert A. Simon, who stressed that the
behavior of near decomposable component systems in the short
run is approximately independent from the behaviors of other
systems, and in the long run, it depends only in an aggregate
way on the behavior of the other components (Simon, 1962).4
Some biological systems may be more highly integrated, which
does not make them resistant to mechanistic explanations, as
some critics claim (Anderson, 2015). This is because mechanisms
may include a highly complex organization of their internal
component parts and operations. Such mechanisms, however,
may be much more difficult to study and could require the use
of specific mathematical techniques developed for research on
complex systems.
In particular, the dynamic approach to cognition may stress
systemic interactions in cognitive systems, but they need not
exclude the possibility of providing dynamical and mechanical
explanations. As many have argued (Kaplan and Bechtel, 2011;
Zednik, 2011; Kaplan, 2015; Lyre, 2017), some phenomena
require the use of mathematical methods typical of dynamical
systems to build complete mechanistic causal explanations.
Role of the Environment for Mechanisms
Part-whole relationships and the causal structure of the
mechanism are usually not sufficient to wholly explain
the phenomenon at hand: the explanation must include
crucial environmental modulation. Only in some very special
circumstances, where the whole dynamics of the phenomenon
depends merely on the underlying mechanism, can one ignore
the environmental modulation (as Craver (2007a) does). In the
case of scissors, one has to include fingers that are required
to move the blades if one is to give a complete explanation of
cutting. However, fingers are not parts of scissors because they
are not constitutively relevant to cutting. As Carl Craver has
4Some analyze the notion of modularity in terms of near-decomposable systems (cf.
Callebaut et al., 2005). Note however, that such notion is much more liberal than
Fodor’s (1983) notion of modularity. Fodor’s account is geared towards cognitive
phenomena and relies on such notions as domain specificity, which have no direct
counterpart in mechanistic decomposability. Moreover, large-scale brain networks,
partially overlapping and partially dissociable, may exhibit near decomposability
to some extent, without being fully modular in Fodor’s sense. Thus, mechanistic
explanation does not imply modularity in Fodor’s sense.
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argued, a good criterion of what counts as a component x of a
mechanism S is its constitutive relevance in the operation of S
(for example, cutting a piece of rope is an operation of scissors).
A component x of S is constitutively relevant for S if and only if
there is a relationship of mutual manipulability between x and S:
(i) x is part of S; (ii) in the conditions relevant to the request
for explanation there is some change to X’s ϕ-ing that changes
S’s ψ-ing; and (iii) in the conditions relevant to the request for
explanation there is some change to S’s ψ-ing that changes X’s
ϕ-ing. (Craver, 2007b, p. 153).
Even if we consider fingers to be spatiotemporal parts of
whatever cuts the rope, they normally do not fulfill condition (iii):
even if moving fingers does change how scissors’ blades move,
blades themselves do not change fingers (or at least, not much;
the application of the physical force will of course impact fingers
as well). Note: it is, in principle, possible to build mechanisms
that would work this way (some kind of self-organizing scissors
with robotic fingers attached, for example); it just doesn’t work
this way in our simple case, in which we count fingers as
environmental modulators. In other words, mechanisms are
not conceived as exclusively responsible for their phenomena.5
On the contrary, mechanistic explanations routinely include the
environment and interactions with other mechanisms.
Mechanistic explanatory strategies have been nicely
summarized by Bechtel in his metaphor of looking down,
around and up:
Accounts of mechanistic explanation have emphasized the
importance of looking down—decomposing a mechanism into its
parts and operations. (. . .) But once multiple components of a
mechanism have been identified, researchers also need to figure
out how it is organized—they must look around and determine
how to recompose the mechanism. (. . .) Researchers also need to
look up—situate a mechanism in its context, which may be a larger
mechanism that modulates its behavior. When looking down
is combined with looking around and up, mechanistic research
results in an integrated, multi-level perspective (Bechtel, 2009,
p. 543).
What we stress in this paper is that mechanistic approaches
do not focus narrowly on the internal structure of cognitive
agents; these approaches require “going wide” to include
causally relevant parts of the environment and interactions with
other cognitive agents. In fact, the accounts of explanation
defended by new mechanists are already wide. Although it
may seem that, to explain something mechanistically is to
elucidate only its internal mechanism, it is not correct in cases
where recomposition of the phenomenon requires additional
explanatory factors. Quite naturally, this happens in most
biological and cognitive cases. For this reason, wide mechanistic
5Moreover, a similar phenomenon may be produced in a different way, for
example, using a knife to cut the rope. In complex biological cases, there
may be even several compensatory mechanisms that evolved to produce similar
phenomena in the case of damage of a basic mechanism. However, because a
mechanism is specified by its phenomena from the mechanistic point of view,
different ways of achieving even a very similar end would count as different
mechanisms. We thank one of the reviewers for requiring more clarity about this
point.
explanations can be used by all researchers interested in the
interaction of cognitive systems with their environments, as
embedded cognition would have it. Mechanistic explanations can
be also applied to study the cases of extended cognition and
analyze the boundaries of cognitive systems (Kaplan, 2012), as
we will show in Section “Applying a Mechanistic Approach to
Mindshaping.”
Bottoming Out: The Basic Level of
Mechanistic Explanations
To add more explanatory depth to our toy example, one
could inquire why the blades are made of metal rather
than, say, paper or polypropylene. In this case, the physical
structure of blades has to be included in the explanation.
The constitutive explanation bottoms out at the level that is
considered sufficiently well understood to elucidate how a whole
mechanism operates. In a certain sense, therefore, mechanistic
constitutive explanations are reductionist (Hensel, 2013) because
they appeal to the internal causal structure of mechanisms
to explain the phenomena at hand. However, they are not
reductionist as they do not screen off complex interactions
inside the mechanism and environmental modulations. In other
words, the whole mechanism is not replaced in a constitutive
explanation by an appeal to general laws of constituents of
the mechanism. Moreover, the level at which an explanation
bottoms out is decided largely pragmatically by the research
community. Thus, the new mechanistic approach is reductionist
only to a moderate extent and in a very extended sense, in
which any denial of the absolute autonomy of psychology from
neuroscience or from social science counts as reductionism.
It is at the same time non-reductionist because it usually
situates a given mechanism in a larger context (Wright,
2007).
In cognitive science, mechanistic explanations will therefore
routinely involve interaction with the environment, cognitive
performance as well as the neural underpinnings of this
performance. Current cognitive science, in contrast to the
evidential standards of the 1960s or 1970s, requires bottoming
out at a level studied with neuroscientific methods (Boone and
Piccinini, 2016); right now, it is not required to cite molecular
or cellular data but evidence about neural structures responsible
for psychological function is normally expected to make a given
explanation plausible. The norms that govern where explanations
bottom out are not, however, legislated a priori by philosophers
in their armchairs, but are assumed as valid in research practices
in various fields of inquiry, which may (sometimes implicitly)
set their own differing standards. Note also that the detail
added to bottom out the explanation has to be still explanatorily
relevant; otherwise, it would violate the completeness norm.
So, any detail that does not bring any further value has to be
discarded.
The mechanistic approach is also natural in the study
of relations between the physical body of an agent and its
neural systems, which is the focus of embodied cognition.
Although proponents of enactivism usually appeal to dynamical
explanations (but see also Abramova and Slors, 2018), these
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explanations can be typically recast in mechanistic terms
(Zednik, 2011). In addition, distributed cognition can be easily
framed in terms of mechanistic explanations; the cognitive
systems composed of cognitive agents and artifacts can be
naturally understood as mechanisms comprising component
parts and operations on external representations. In the next
subsection, we describe distributed cognition as mechanistic
more fully.
Airplane Cockpit as Exemplar Cognitive
Mechanism
The mechanistic approach can be illustrated with an example
of a study about how the structure of the cockpit in an
airplane supports complex, distributed cognitive processes.
Edwin Hutchins studied in particular the use of physical devices
to remember the speed of the aircraft:
The cockpit system remembers its speeds, and the memory
process emerges from the activity of the pilots. The memory of
the cockpit, however, is not made primarily of pilot memory.
A complete theory of individual human memory would not
be sufficient to understand that which we wish to understand
because so much of the memory function takes place outside the
individual. In some sense, what the theory of individual human
memory explains is not how this system works, but why this
system must contain so many components that are functionally
implicated in cockpit memory, yet are external to the pilots
themselves (Hutchins, 1995b, p. 286).
The process is distributed and includes two pilots as its
component submechanisms, one responsible for flying and
navigating the plane, and another responsible for communication
and other tasks. But the distributed approach may well appeal
to heuristics preferred by other wide approaches to the study of
cognition (see Figure 1).
This can lead to the discovery of all sorts of crucial
mechanisms. First, the embodied perspective will hypothesize
that the design of control devices is adapted to sensorimotor
characteristics of a human being, and may study the quality of
design in terms of how easily it can be operated, for example,
by seeing whether surfaces become slippery, buttons difficult
to press and confusing, etc. The situated perspective will insist
that the cognitive artifacts in the cockpit all constrain, and help
to determine the plane weight, etc., which is crucial to land
the aircraft. Alternatively, the extended view may study how
well the minds of individuals mesh with multiple devices on
board. Lastly, the enactive perspective will stress the importance
of dynamic coordination between pilots and consider how the
environment is structured in terms of various affordances. At
the same time, the distributed approach does not screen off the
study of representational devices; on the contrary, as Hutchins
stresses:
This article presents a theoretical framework that takes a
socio-technical system, rather than an individual mind, as its
primary unit of analysis. This theory is explicitly cognitive in the
sense that it is concerned with how information is represented
and how representations are transformed and propagated through
the system. Such a theory can provide a bridge between
FIGURE 1 | Wide approaches to the study of cognition.
the information processing properties of individuals and the
information processing properties of a larger system, such as an
airplane cockpit (Hutchins, 1995b, pp. 286–287).
This example shows how wide cognition, with its different
theoretical component approaches that can cluster together, is
poised to study phenomena related to cognitive processing.
This suggests that specific wide perspectives are not particularly
attractive in isolation. Instead, they can be further developed and
integrated to form a larger mechanistic framework (cf. Abramova
and Slors, 2018; Wachowski, 2018).
Silent Mechanistic Revolution
The mechanistic revolution in cognitive science is silent insofar
as it need not involve any widespread theoretical controversies.
Contra to an opinion made popular by Kuhn (1962), a
significant portion of the Scientific Revolution happened
without much controversy (Wootton, 2015). Mechanistic
explanation, as the underlying methodological framework, is
not universally accepted in psychology, or at least in philosophy
of psychology (Shapiro, 2016; Weiskopf, 2016). Most of
the time, however, it goes unnoticed, just like references to
mechanisms in papers and textbooks in cognitive science
(for example, see how frequently Gardner (1985) mentions
biological, cognitive, psychological, and information-processing
mechanisms).
To further show that wide cognition is studied already in a
mechanistic fashion, even if the notion of mechanism itself is not
used prominently, we will describe two cases in some depth: we
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will look at explanatory accounts of mind-reading and emotion
that go beyond a single ‘wide’ account of cognitive processes. We
will show that in both of these cases, they can be understood as
wide mechanistic explanations. They capture the essence of wide
cognition.
WIDE MECHANISMS OF MINDSHAPING
In this section, we describe mind-reading as a multi-faceted
phenomenon. One of the ways to frame mind-reading is
to understand it in terms of mindshaping (Zawidzki, 2013),
which has both institutional and biological underpinnings.
The proposed explanation is best understood, we claim, in
mechanistic terms, and cannot be accounted for as exemplifying
a merely an embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, or even
distributed perspective on cognition.
Previous Models: Mindreading
In philosophy, as well as in developmental and comparative
psychology, social cognition has traditionally been understood
in terms of mind-reading. This is a technical term that is often
(although not always) used interchangeably with “mentalizing”
and “theory of mind.”
The guiding concept behind the notions of mind-reading,
mentalizing, and theory of mind is that an individual’s
success at predicting the behavior of and coordinating with
her con-specifics depends on understanding the unseen
psychological causes responsible for their behavior. There are
two classic competing accounts of mind-reading: theory theory
(Perner, 1991; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997) and simulation theory
(Harris, 2000; Goldman, 2006). According to theory theory,
mind-reading relies on a body of implicit knowledge, represented
as general rules or underwritten by innate modular mechanisms.
In contrast, simulation theory holds that understanding others
does not depend on inferential processes relying on rules or
modular mechanisms but on mental modeling, pretending or
imagining oneself to be in the other’s situation. In spite of this
difference, the two competing accounts share one important
feature: on these orthodox conceptions of human social
cognition, differences in the sophistication of social interaction,
e.g., cooperation and coordination, across phylogenetic and
ontogenetic time, can be traced to the sophistication of
interactants’ theories of mind. For example, whereas non-human
primates are restricted to an understanding of con-specifics’
goals, perceptions, emotional states, and behavioral dispositions,
adult humans can also attribute beliefs, intentions, and other
propositional attitudes, arranged in rational plans causally
responsible for their interactants’ behaviors.
However, this orthodox understanding of social cognition
remains under considerable pressure. For example, Dennett
(1971, 1987) argues that a non-human animal, a human infant,
and even a typical human adult operates with a form of social
cognition that does not depend on their understanding of
the unseen psychological causes of each other’s behavior via
sophisticated theories of mind. Rather, he argues, most social
cognition involves an understanding of perspectives—an ability
to track relations between whole organisms and features of the
environment salient to these organisms—what Dennett calls
an “intentional stance” (cf. Zawidzki, 2012). Understanding of
hidden psychological causes, especially propositional attitudes,
depends on prior enculturation in culturally specific practices
(Køster, 2017), and is useful only in making sense of deviations
from or exceptions to typical behavioral patterns.
It is widely recognized that propositional attitudes, like
belief and desire, bear very tenuous relations to observable
circumstances and behavior. The reason is holism: even on
orthodox views, particular propositional attitudes lead to
behavior only against a background of indefinitely many other
propositional attitudes (Bermúdez, 1995). For example, a belief
that it is raining will issue in umbrella retrieval only when
conjoined with a desire to stay dry that is stronger than
competing desires, appropriate beliefs about the location of
an umbrella and the relative costs of retrieving it, etc. This
feature of propositional attitudes raises significant problems
for the orthodox conception of social cognition as being
dependent on mind-reading, and especially for the widely
held assumption that successful navigation of the social world
requires attributing propositional attitudes. This is because it
raises issues of computational tractability. Most successful social
interactions take place seamlessly and dynamically at relatively
short time scales. It seems unlikely that successful interpreters
search the immense space of propositional attitude attributions
compatible with brief, observed bouts of behavior, in time to
arrive at attributions accurate enough to support successful
interaction (for a more detailed computational analysis, see
Zeppi and Blokpoel, 2017). For this reason, a number of
theorists have recently raised worries about the orthodox
conception.
Applying a Mechanistic Approach to
Mindshaping
Zawidzki (2013) argues that human populations are
distinguished from our closest non-human relatives by an
array of effective “mindshaping” techniques, aimed at making
potential interactants more alike, and hence easier to interpret,
which is a clear example of “looking around” internal cognitive
mechanisms, or adopting the situated perspective in the study of
cognition. For example, only humans engage in “over-imitation”
(Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2010), that is, copying each other’s
fine-grained, apparently non-functional behaviors. Only humans
engage in constant and pervasive pedagogy. Only humans set up
elaborate normative regimes, and linguistic, narrative constructs,
and then pressure each other to conform to them. Such practices
tend to make human populations easier to interpret.
In addition, Zawidzki argues that the attribution of full-blown
propositional attitudes evolved to play a justificatory, rather
than a predictive, function. That is, rather than help predict
the behavior of potential interactants, attribution of full-blown
propositional attitudes evolved as a tool for situating interactants
in a normative space—as committed and entitled to various
discursive and non-discursive moves, given prior such moves.
Inspired by Brandom’s (1994) theory of discursive practice, this
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idea finds some support in social psychology as well. Bruner
(1990) points out that many everyday uses of propositional
attitude attributions are triggered by behavior that deviates from
a canonical cultural pattern, and function to excuse or at least
make sense of the behavior, e.g., when a person appears to break
some norm, as when one fails to fulfill a promise, sanctions
can be mitigated if one can provide an excuse in terms of
what one was thinking. There is some empirical evidence in
favor of this hypothesis: Malle et al. (2007) showed that, when
explaining behavior, adults are much more likely to appeal
to reason explanations, i.e., propositional attitudes, when they
are motivated to make the behavior look good. Without such
motivation, they are more likely to explain behavior in terms of
causal history.
Incorporating Culture Into a Wide
Mechanism
The mind-shaping hypothesis, and the role of propositional
attitude attribution in justifying apparently counter-normative
behavior to one’s interactants, suggest a very precise sense
in which human social cognition is “wide”: much of the
work required to predict our fellows involves not intracranial
socio-cognitive resources, like so-called “theory of mind,” but
rather, external cultural practices aimed at making our likely
interactants more familiar and easier to anticipate. Culture
seems to function as a classic example of “epistemic action”
(Kirsh, 1996; Clark, 1997). Rather than tackle the seemingly
computationally intractable task of predicting our con-specifics
by building ever more complex, intracranial computational
capacity, natural selection seems to have developed systematic
means of structuring the social environment in ways that
make it easier to predict using relatively simple intracranial
resources. The variety of mind-shaping techniques employed by
a given culture—over-imitation, pedagogy, norm construction
and enforcement, the use of linguistic narrative, e.g., myths, to
construct “virtual” models for all to imitate—can all be seen
as forms of wide social cognition, aimed at regimenting the
potentially unruly and intractable social environment. If this
hypothesis is on the right track, then it suggests that the study
of culture and its effects on cognition must play a central role in
the sciences of social cognition.
What this hypothesis suggests, therefore, is that a wide
array of factors—factors that go beyond properties of single
individuals—have to be included in the explanation. But one
cannot simply produce this explanation by referring merely to
embodiment, embeddedness, cognitive extension or enaction,
or even distributed cognition. These perspectives offer limited
guidance for the case at hand. Instead, the focus on cultural and
social factors is much more salient.
In fact, over the past 15 years there have been many
new research programs exploring the impact of culture
on the development of human cognitive structures. Areas
of knowledge that deal with this subject are cross-cultural
psychology, neuroanthropology and cultural neuroscience. What
unites the above-mentioned disciplines is the emphasis put
on socio-cultural aspects of human cognitive abilities. This
position is sometimes known as bio-cultural constructivism
(Baltes et al., 2006) and it states “that brain and culture
are in a continuous, interdependent, co-productive transaction
and reciprocal determination” (Baltes et al., 2006). The basic
assumption is that the structure of the human brain is
not programmed a priori, but rather is co-shaped by the
environmental stimulation in a broad sense: the socio-cultural
experience of the entity, its environment, etc. Generalizing, the
process of ontogenetic development is stimulated genetically,
environmentally and culturally. Consequently, this leads to the
abandonment of radical genetic, neuronal, cultural determinism,
or environmentalism and highlights the simultaneous impact of
all the above factors on human ontogeny and evolution. This,
in turn, means that researchers produce explanatory texts that
mention complex mechanisms, whose causal organization may
lead to observed cognitive performance.
Relevance of the Mechanistic Approach
At the same time, the mindshaping hypothesis is right now not
fully developed in terms of a complete mechanistic explanation.
In particular, the entities and operations responsible for the
cultural and social constraints on human behavior are not
fully understood in terms of neurocognitive mechanisms. For
this reason, this explanation remains highly schematic and so,
according to the mechanistic view, requires further development.
But this development clearly requires integrative efforts, which
is what researchers studying mindreading usually presuppose.
For example, it is most likely that separate mechanisms underlie
the various forms of mindshaping, i.e., overimitation, pedagogy,
norm institution and enforcement, and self-constitution in
terms of roles in narratives expressed in public language. These
mechanisms may be, in turn, involved either in attributing
unobservable entities such as beliefs, or in mere tracking
relational properties of bouts of behavior. The mindshaping
hypothesis suggests the latter may be the case for a number of
them (Fenici and Zawidzki, 2017). Decomposing the dense web
of interrelationships between these mechanisms is also a difficult
ongoing research task.
In other words, just like most mechanistic explanations in
life and cognitive sciences, this explanation is far from the
ideal; nevertheless, mechanistic norms of completeness may
drive further study of the phenomena in question. From our
point of view, it is crucial to stress that a wide perspective on
mind-reading naturally fosters the development of mechanistic
explanations.
EMOTIONS AND THEIR EXPRESSIONS
In this section, we show how the mechanistic view offers
methodological advice and goes beyond idle debates over the role
of the environment in emotional expression.
Previous Models of Emotion
Dominant theories of emotion tend to adopt an individualistic
perspective. Whether modeled as evaluative judgments,
appraisal processes, physiological states of bodily arousal, or
something else, emotions are commonly thought of as private
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states individuated by their neurobiology, cognitive content,
behavioral expression, or phenomenal character (Damasio,
2000; Nussbaum, 2001; Prinz, 2004; Laird, 2007; Russell, 2009;
Panksepp, 2014). From this perspective, the social and cultural
environment is of secondary interest for understanding the
inner (i.e., agent-centric) mechanisms that are the real heart of
emotions. However, the mechanistic approach to explanation
does not conform to this kind of individualism, even if bodily
aspects of emotion are usually understood as individual.
Role of Embodiment for Emotion
One can argue that the embodied character of emotions is a
necessary condition on their being social. The embodied account
of emotion claims that the brain alone is not sufficient to generate
emotional experience. Rather, the rest of the (non-neural)
body, in all its biological, physiological, morphological, and
kinematic details, makes a non-trivial contribution to the
realization of some emotions. For example, many studies appear
to indicate a reciprocal relation between an emotional experience
and its behavioral expression. Subjects induced to adopt an
emotion-specific facial expression or posture report experiencing
the corresponding emotion (Edelman, 1984; Duclos and Laird,
2001; Laird, 2007; Winkielman, 2010; Marzoli et al., 2013;
Davis et al., 2015). Conversely, inhibiting the expression (e.g.,
suppressing the facial signature of anger or happiness) diminishes
the associated experience (Strack et al., 1988; de Gelder, 2006;
Niedenthal, 2007; Oberman et al., 2007; Niedenthal et al.,
2009; see however Wagenmakers et al., 2016 for the results
of replication of Strack et al., 1988). Individuals who suffer
severe spinal cord injuries and lose the capacity to behaviorally
express emotions report less-intense feelings of high-arousal
emotions like fear and anger (Chwalisz et al., 1988; Laird, 2007;
see Bermond et al., 1991). Still other studies have found that
inhibited facial expressiveness—e.g., following Botox injections
(Davis et al., 2010; Havas et al., 2010) or due to congenital facial
paralysis (Cole and Spalding, 2008) — results in diminished
emotional phenomenology.
Embodied approaches to emotion thus emphasize the extent
to which emotions depend upon extra-neural factors and
feedback (Winkielman et al., 2015). Moreover, if the physical
expression of anger, say, is literally a part of the anger itself—that
is, part of its physical realization—some emotions, in virtue of
their embodied character, can be said to have a social face. They
are partially constituted by world-directed features perceptually
available to other agents (Krueger, 2012). But this embodied
perspective remains a fairly conservative way of thinking about
the social character of emotions because the environment does
not enter into this characterization in any substantive manner.
Incorporating Sociality Into Wide
Mechanism of Emotion
A wide mechanistic perspective on emotions, by contrast, urges
that emotions are fundamentally social phenomena: they are
scaffolded and shaped by features of the agent’s social niche,
as well as the various ways the individual—along with other
emotional agents—actively modifies and negotiates this shared
niche (Fischer and Manstead, 2005; Krueger, 2013; Slaby, 2014;
Colombetti and Roberts, 2015; Krueger and Szanto, 2016;
Colombetti, 2017). Accordingly, the role of the environment
is seen not merely as providing stimulus inputs and serving
as an arena for behavioral outputs. Rather, the environment—
understood broadly to include not only material features of the
agent’s niche, but also sociocultural and interpersonal aspects
as well—plays an active role in shaping emotions on multiple
time scales (Parkinson et al., 2005), including both the moment-
to-moment character of emotional episodes, as well as the
long-term development of an individual’s emotional repertoire
(Griffiths and Scarantino, 2008). While not entirely jettisoning
a consideration of internal mechanisms, a wide perspective
on emotions thus argues that the larger bodily, social, and
interactive context in which emotions are situated needs to
be part of the target explanandum. This also follows naturally
from the mechanistic perspective, which provides no privileged
explanatory position for the biological agent. For mechanists, the
set of all and only causally relevant factors relevant to a given
phenomenon counts as explanatorily relevant.
To a large extent, proponents of embodied or extended
accounts of emotion are not that radical in claiming that
emotions cannot be understood exclusively as properties of
individuals. From the evolutionary point of view, the expression
of emotion plays primarily a communicative role (Darwin, 1872),
and to understand the causal structure of the communication
process, one cannot limit the explanation to the agent
that experiences one emotion. Moreover, because they play
communicative roles across various species, there is a strong
selection pressure to develop at least a limited number of
universal expressions of emotions, a point widely appreciated
nowadays (Ekman, 2016; but see Barrett L.F., 2016 for a different
view). For example, it has been elaborated in experiments that
look at multiple sources of feedback that may modulate the felt
emotion itself.
Consider the work on audience effects, which indicates
that emotional responses differ, depending on whether there
is an audience or not. For example, ten-pin bowlers smile
significantly more after producing a positive event (e.g., bowling
a strike or a spare) when they turn to face their friends than
when they are still facing the pin (Kraut and Johnston, 1979).
A similar effect has been observed in Spanish soccer fans
who issue authentic (i.e., “Duchenne”) smiles (Ekman et al.,
1990) in response to goals only when facing another person
(Fernández-Dols et al., 1997), as well as in Olympic gold-medal
winners who smile almost exclusively when receiving their gold
medal (and not when they are alone prior to the ceremony)
(Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda, 1995). Audience effects have
even been observed in young infants (Jones et al., 1991).
Other work in developmental psychology demonstrates how the
repertoire of physical strategies caregivers use to engage with
infants—facial expressions, postural adjustments, exaggerated
gestures and vocalizations, gaze manipulation, etc.—function as
real-time scaffolding supporting the emergence, regulation, and
performance of many basic emotions from the beginning of life
(Tronick et al., 1978; Posner and Rothbart, 1998; Rochat, 2009;
Reddy, 2010; Hobson, 2011). This research supports the thesis
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that certain emotions depend crucially upon the ongoing (i.e.,
synchronic) feedback and support of the social-communicative
context in which they are situated.
Relevance of the Mechanistic Approach
A mechanistic explanation of emotional phenomena need not
deny the importance of the brain or individual mechanisms,
and most emotions do not need to be actually perceived by
some other agent to be felt. But it should avoid incomplete
explanations, which by being excessively narrow in selecting
causally relevant factors and abstracting emotions away from
the broader bodily, social, and cultural contexts, violates an
important mechanistic explanatory norm, namely completeness
(Craver, 2007b). The modulating effects of emotional expression
and feedback, however, cannot support the radical view that
emotion itself extends into the physical environment. One way
to justify this point is to appeal to methodological principles
of what counts the part of a given mechanism (see Role of the
Environment for Mechanisms above), which state that only what
is constitutively relevant to the phenomenon to be explained is
part of the mechanism.
Consider now the case of an Olympic medal winner. The
environment, for example, seats on the Olympic stadium, would
be constitutively relevant to the emotion as long as their removal
would change the emotion, and if the change of the emotion
of winners would influence the seats. This is definitely not the
case; only the emotions felt by agents who perceive emotional
expressions change. Moreover, a perception of the expressed
emotion may trigger this (or another) emotion. Nonetheless, the
mechanistic approach, while not without its own problems,6 can
help to clarify the issues in the debate over the “wide” nature
of emotions. The only candidate components for “extended
emotional mechanisms,” beyond one’s own bodily and neural
processes, are the bodily and neural processes of other agents, not
arbitrary physical things in the environment.
Further, the explanatory advantage of assuming the extended
mind or extended emotion, over the embedded account
thereof, is rather doubtful.7 While it is certainly possible to
adopt a view on emotional or cognitive phenomena that
would make certain non-neural and non-bodily processes
components of emotional or cognitive mechanisms, as long as the
completeness norm is followed, this move makes no explanatory
difference vis-à-vis considering the same phenomena more
narrowly construed, this time just modulated by environmental
triggers.8
6The issue of delineating boundaries of mechanisms in all possible cases goes far
beyond the scope of this paper.
7For further discussion of the explanatory equivalence of both accounts, see
(Barker, 2010; Sprevak, 2010). It is argued that there is no matter of fact that could
adjudicate between the two hypotheses.
8If the phenomenon to be explained is considered “the reciprocal influence of
agents’ emotional expression,” then one must include all and only mechanisms
relevant for this process, which will include at least two agents. However, if one is
interested only in the other agent’s felt emotions, then the first agent can be treated
as the environmental trigger. The causal networks in both cases are different and
depend (partially) on one’s explanatory interest. This is not to say that causation
is not objective. What depends on our cognitive interests is how we specify the
phenomena to be explained. Note, however, that some phenomena can be specified
Mechanistic criteria of constitutive relevance decide what is
a component of a mechanism but not what a given mechanism
is a mechanism of. This is up to a theorist. It’s a large
oversimplification to say that the mechanism is question in
the first case is just an “emotional mechanism”; it’s rather
a mechanism of reciprocal influence of emotional expression,
which may include a number of agents. In such a case, not
only do both the embedded and extended view appeal to the
same causal networks, while insisting that the boundaries of
what they consider to be emotional mechanisms are different.
But it would be mildly confusing to call these mechanisms
simply “emotional” because their function can be specified
more precisely and is context-bound. The debate based on
oversimplification is thus idle; from the mechanistic point of
view, both parties are wrong because the phenomena to be
explained are not just emotions. Nevertheless, the mechanistic
approach to explanation does not decide where the mind or
emotion starts or ends.
To sum up, in this section, we have argued that the wide
perspective on emotions requires more conceptual clarity, and
this is what the mechanistic approach offers. It can resolve
some conundrums by dissolving explanatorily idle debates. While
further research on emotions as relying on non-individual
factors is required by mechanistic norms of explanation,
in particular to fully link social factors with mechanisms
studied by affective neuroscience, the mechanistic approach
aptly describes current integrative efforts in the study of
emotion.
POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
In this section, we briefly review possible objections to the
claim that there is an ongoing mechanistic revolution in wide
approaches in cognitive (neuro)science.
Dynamical, Not Mechanistic
One way to argue against the claim that mechanisms underlie
the ongoing scientific practice in cognitive (neuro)science, in
particular inspired by wide perspectives, is to say that dynamical
explanation is more frequently appealed to by its proponents.
Indeed, Menary (2007), in proposing his framework of cognitive
integration, which takes inspiration from the extended and
situated perspectives, stresses the importance of dynamical
explanation:
it is based on the idea of multiple cognitive layers where neural,
bodily, and environmental processes all conspire to complete
cognitive tasks. Although the framework is unified by a dynamical
systems description of the evolution of processing in the hybrid
and multi-layered system, it recognizes the novel contributions
of the distinct processing profiles of the brain, body, and
environment (Menary, 2015, p. 2).
There are two possible lines of reply to this argument. The
first one is to stress that mere dynamical explanations are
falsely, and some specifications can lead to overly complex or intractable models.
There is no mechanism of telekinesis, for example.
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actually explanatorily unsatisfactory (Kaplan and Craver, 2011).
In fact, dynamical explanation at its core relies on the received
view of explanation, which requires appeal to universal laws
(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948, 1953). When a dynamical
explanation is not equivalent to a mechanistic one, it is,
according to Craver and Kaplan, simply deficient because
it is open to well-known objections put forward against
the received view (cf. Craver, 2007b). Dynamical regularities
referred to in cognitive explanations are usually not universal
generalizations and remain invariant in an extremely limited
number of contexts. Although one could in principle re-
describe a mechanism by appealing to regularities, these
regularities will be true of entities and activities whose
organization is jointly responsible for a given phenomenon.
It is extremely difficult to find dynamical explanations that
do not appeal to causally organized systems; and this is
what makes purported dynamical explanations equivalent to
mechanistic explanations (Walmsley, 2008; Zednik, 2011). In
other words, as far as explanations involved in Menary’s cognitive
integration framework are genuine, they are, despite appearances,
mechanistic.
Another but related reply is to stress the role of activities
or processes, which makes dynamical explanations part and
parcel of a particular kind of explanations, namely dynamical
mechanistic explanations (Bechtel, 2015). In other words, the
mechanistic approach to explanation sometimes has to appeal to
dynamical models, in particular when time-related phenomena
are in question.
To wit, the proponent of dynamicism has the burden of
proving that mechanistic explanations are somehow deficient.
But this is extremely difficult. All successful dynamical
explanations can be exploited for building mechanistic
explanatory models, while rejecting dynamical attempts
that violate mechanistic norms (for example, they abstract
away from the rich internal structure of mechanisms when it is
causally relevant). By way of reply, the dynamicist could claim
that these purported non-mechanical dynamical explanations
are crucial in cognitive science by systematically reviewing the
most significant empirical results achieved in the last 50 years
and showing that they cannot be properly understood in either
functionalist or mechanistic manner. Still, until the dynamicist
does this, both of the aforementioned responses are available to
the mechanist.
Functionalist Alternative
Opponents of mechanistic explanation may further object
that mechanisms are not the sole focus of cognitive science;
in particular, they may claim that functional explanations are
genuinely explanatory (Shapiro, 2016). However, one may
counter that mere functional analyses are no longer accepted in
cognitive science as satisfactory and are in fact treated as mere
mechanism sketches, or essentially incomplete explanations
(Piccinini and Craver, 2011). Nonetheless, mechanistic
explanations in cognitive science are in one respect close to
the functional approach in that they deal with mechanisms that
have biological or psychological functions (Garson, 2013), but
in fact wide perspectives are incompatible with the autonomy of
psychology presupposed by functional explanation traditionally
understood. Functional autonomy was sometimes spelled out
in extreme terms and this extreme appeal to autonomy is what
the mechanistic approach rejects. For example, autonomy was
defended by saying that we could be made of Swiss cheese,
and it wouldn’t matter (Putnam, 1975, p. 291). It would; we
wouldn’t be human cognitive agents anymore, just inert blobs
of cheese. The causal organization of an agent cannot be
duplicated in just any physical substrate. Similarly, scientists no
longer accept abstract box-and-arrows diagrams as satisfactory
explanations.
One major difference between functionalist box-and-arrows
diagrams and mechanistic explanations is that most defenders
of functionalism required only that the posited functional
organization be sufficient for the capacity to be present (Newell
and Simon, 1972, p. 13; Cummins, 1975). For example,
according to defenders of sufficiency analysis, one could
produce a computer simulation of translation that would
behave similar as human translators, and such simulation
would be explanatory. However, critics point out that the
same behavior could be produced in different ways and
that genuinely explanatory models have to be constrained by
what is known to be not only sufficient but also actually
causally relevant (Miłkowski, 2013, p. 119). In the case of
machine translation, statistical and neural-network methods
might produce similar outputs but the first one is not even
remotely biologically plausible (Koehn, 2010). This is why
abstract diagrams of systems sufficient to perform some activity
are no longer considered explanatory in contemporary cognitive
research.
To prove this point, one can point out that the currently
influential predictive processing account of cognition, which
remains largely sketchy and devoid of detailed models of the
causal dynamics of the nervous system, strives for mechanistic
evidence (Gordon et al., 2017). Were neuroscientific evidence
not useful, the effort in producing it would be a symptom
of irrationality among researchers, and defenders would not
take pride in showing this kind of evidence. Contrarily, it is
exactly the fact that the evidence about entities and activities
is required to substantiate functional analyses that makes
it also a mechanistic sketch. These are current evidential
standards in cognitive (neuro)science (Boone and Piccinini,
2016).
Second, as soon as one adopts an embodied and situated
perspective, autonomy claims and functionalism cease to be
attractive. As proponents of embodiment should be aware,
autonomy claims were not successfully established by recourse to
multiple realization, or the (purported) fact that some capacities
may be realized by any system with the same functional
organization but sufficiently different causal structure (cf. Aizawa
and Gillett, 2011; Polger and Shapiro, 2016). It is simply much
more natural to adopt a mechanistic perspective and to argue
for embodiment than to adopt functionalism and argue for
embodiment, even if many proponents of embodied cognition
adopted a functionalist perspective (Clark, 2008a). If bodily
features could be multiply realized by just any functional
structure, are they actually bodily features? For example, it seems
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highly dubious that a computational simulation of a body might
replace the physical bodily interaction in any biological agent
without loss, and the stress on the role of the physical body is
at the core of a strong embodiment thesis (Dempsey and Shani,
2013).
A related objection may be connected to the fairly abstract
and sketchy nature of some proposed wide explanations.
For example, the notion of affordance, which has become
popular among wide approaches, is usually introduced in terms
of agent-environment interaction, without positing internal
mechanisms at all. But cognitive neuroscientists do not consider
it absurd to inquire into neurocognitive mechanisms of
affordance perception; in fact, there is already some work
consistent with a mechanistic approach (Young, 2006; Cisek,
2007).
In other words, it seems that the overarching assumption
in cognitive science today is that one cannot simply point to
mere functional analysis. Mere functional analysis is essentially
incomplete because it need not contain any relevant causal
detail: sufficiency analysis may produce structures that have
no causal relevance for the phenomenon, as in the case
of traditional statistical machine translation, which is wildly
disparate from how people translate even if its results may fairly
coincide.
Anti-representationalism and
Anti-computationalism
In some discussions about wide approaches to cognition,
it is presupposed that they exclude representationalism or
computationalism (Barrett L., 2016), which have been traditional
assumptions of mainstream cognitive science. But things are
perhaps not so simple. Computationalism is certainly compatible
with wide approaches, in particular when paired with the
mechanistic account of physical computation (Miłkowski, 2013;
Villalobos and Dewhurst, 2017), but the issue of representation
is more complex. While proponents of radical enactivism
remain highly critical of the notion of mental content (Hutto
and Myin, 2013), their criticism, from the methodological
point of view, is mostly motivated by parsimony arguments.
In fact, in some cases it may indeed be worthwhile to see
whether full-blown mental content is required for explanations
instead of reliance on affordances in the environment, without
deciding a priori that unobservable entities are not admissible
in science, which admittedly would be an extreme interpretation
of radical enactivism (Clowes and Mendonça, 2016; Gärtner
and Clowes, 2017). Other proponents of wide approaches,
particularly in the case of the perceptual symbol systems,
remain strongly motivated by representationalism (Barsalou,
1999); many stress that wide approaches cannot and should
not reject representationalism (Schlosser, 2017; Wheeler,
2017).
If wide approaches are understood as only offering generic
heuristic advice, as we claim, then such approaches are not
decisive when it comes to determining the status of computations
or representations. Nonetheless, wide approaches can lead
us to be careful when positing such processes, which is
exactly what mechanistic explanation requires, namely that
we need additional causal evidence from lower levels of
mechanistic organization in order to talk of computation and
representation.
SUMMARY
Wide approaches to cognition cannot be applied to the
study of cognition in isolation. Methodological and sometimes
ideological controversies around embodiment and situatedness,
for example, look outdated when we focus on current explanatory
practice in cognitive science. Researchers appeal to wide factors
merely as discovery heuristics. In essence, the mechanistic turn
that is beginning to pervade wide approaches in cognitive
(neuro)science is the natural next step of the mechanistic
revolution already prevalent in cognitive (neuro)science (Boone
and Piccinini, 2016).
Wide perspectives on cognition, we claim, are fruitful when
applied together in the practice of building mechanistic models,
which can be further constrained, for example, by available
psychopathological, neurophysiological, psychophysiological, or
psychological evidence. Taken in isolation, they offer very little
theoretical advice.
A wide mechanistic perspective should not deny the
significance of the brain or individual mechanisms, or it
will prematurely advise against testing hypotheses about
potentially relevant causal factors. If cognition is not only
the result of individual innate cognitive processes but also
of culturally-afforded competence acquired by individuals and
groups alike, it is only natural to assume that mechanistic
explanations will include a fair number of wide causal factors.
Wide cognition is therefore not a grand theory of everything
that could supply all possible detailed hypotheses about cognitive
phenomena. Instead, it merely helps reject self-imposed and
unnecessary restrictions in the study of their mechanisms.
We claim that the silent mechanistic revolution ongoing in
cognitive (neuro)science helps to bring the insights from these
wide perspectives together by showing their role as research
heuristics.
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